

Online Appendix

Supplemental Materials for “Public Opinion, International Reputation, and Audience Costs in an Authoritarian Regime”

Appendix A: Summary Statistics

Table A1: Sociodemographic Measures of Respondents in Wave 1

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Obs</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>
<i>Age</i>	1,023	31.88	6.87	19	63
<i>Age >30</i>	1,037	0.57	0.50	0	1
<i>Education</i>	1,023	4.89	0.72	1	7
<i>College Degree</i>	1,037	0.83	0.38	0	1
<i>Gender</i>	1,037	0.51	0.50	0	1
<i>CCP Member</i>	1,037	0.27	0.45	0	1
<i>International News</i>	1,037	0.79	0.41	0	1
<i>Coastal</i>	1,037	0.64	0.48	0	1
<i>West</i>	1,037	0.10	0.30	0	1
<i>Central</i>	1,037	0.29	0.45	0	1

Notes: Age is measured in years. Education is a 7-point scale ranging from primary education to doctorate. Gender is an indicator variable with 1 indicating male. CCP member is an indicator variable with 1 indicating party member. Interest in international news is based on a question asking about how much the respondent cares about international news (1 = “care somewhat” and “care a lot”). Coastal, central, and west are coded based on respondents’ location of province.

Table A2: Sociodemographic Measures of Respondents in Wave 2

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Obs</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>
<i>Age</i>	2,224	2.68	0.83	1	6
<i>Age >30</i>	2,224	0.53	0.50	0	1
<i>College Degree</i>	2,224	0.94	0.24	0	1
<i>Gender</i>	2,224	0.48	0.50	0	1
<i>CCP Member</i>	2,224	0.25	0.44	0	1
<i>International News</i>	2,224	0.83	0.38	0	1
<i>Coastal</i>	2,224	0.78	0.42	0	1
<i>West</i>	2,224	0.07	0.25	0	1
<i>Central</i>	2,224	0.16	0.36	0	1
<i>Income</i>	2,136	3.68	1.59	1	7
<i>Social Status</i>	2,224	5.06	1.90	0	10

Notes: Age is measured in six age cohorts. Gender is an indicator variable with 1 indicating male. CCP member is an indicator variable with 1 indicating party member. Interest in international news is based on a question asking about how much the respondent cares about international news (1 = “care somewhat” and “care a lot”). Coastal, central, and west are coded based on respondents’ location of province. Income is measured on a seven-point scale with 1 indicating less than 10,000 Yuan (approximately \$1,600) annual income. Social Status is respondent's self-perceived social group on a 10-point scale from poorest to richest.

Table A3: Sociodemographic Measures of Respondents in Wave 3

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Obs</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>
<i>Age</i>	2,114	32.54	8.98	16	100
<i>Age >30</i>	2,114	0.53	0.50	0	1
<i>Education</i>	2,114	6.75	0.88	1	9
<i>College Degree</i>	2,114	0.76	0.43	0	1
<i>Gender</i>	2,114	0.50	0.50	0	1
<i>CCP Member</i>	2,114	0.28	0.45	0	1
<i>International News</i>	2,114	0.77	0.42	0	1
<i>Income</i>	2,061	3.62	1.61	1	7
<i>Social Status</i>	2,114	4.44	1.65	0	10

Notes: Age is measured in years. Education is a nine-point scale ranging from no formal education to doctorate. Gender is an indicator variable with 1 indicating male. CCP member is an indicator variable with 1 indicating party member. Interest in international news is based on a question asking about how much the respondent cares about international news (1 = “care somewhat” and “care a lot”). Income is measured on a seven-point scale with 1 indicating less than 10,000 Yuan (approximately \$1,600) annual income. Social Status is respondent's self-perceived social group on a 10-point scale from poorest to richest.

Appendix B: Balance Check

Table B1: Covariates Balance across the Five Scenarios in Wave 1

<i>Scenarios</i>	<i>S1</i>	<i>S2</i>	<i>S3</i>	<i>S4</i>	<i>S5</i>
<i>Age</i>	31.54	31.26	31.97	31.21	33.47
<i>Education</i>	4.93	4.91	4.92	4.88	4.82
<i>Gender</i>	0.54	0.49	0.50	0.53	0.47
<i>CCP Member</i>	0.30	0.28	0.28	0.23	0.27
<i>International News</i>	0.78	0.75	0.79	0.81	0.80
<i>Coastal</i>	0.62	0.63	0.65	0.62	0.68
<i>West</i>	0.12	0.07	0.08	0.12	0.09
<i>Central</i>	0.28	0.31	0.30	0.31	0.25
<i>Regime type</i>	0.51	0.47	0.47	0.52	0.49
<i>Motive</i>	0.55	0.52	0.44	0.43	0.46
<i>Power</i>	0.50	0.47	0.50	0.44	0.55
<i>Stakes</i>	0.42	0.48	0.50	0.55	0.53

Notes: Age is measured in years. Education is a 7-point scale ranging from primary education to doctorate. Gender is an indicator variable with 1 indicating male. CCP member is an indicator variable with 1 indicating party member. Interest in international news is based on a question asking about how much the respondent cares about international news (1 = “care somewhat” and “care a lot”). Coastal, central, and west are coded based on respondents’ location of province. Regime type, motive, power, and stakes correspond to the four contextual variables embedded in the experiment. The bold numbers indicate that the variable is a statistically significant predictor ($p < 0.05$) of that scenario as opposed to the other scenarios in a logistic regression model.

Table B2: Covariates Balance across the Five Scenarios in Wave 2

<i>Scenarios</i>	<i>S1</i>	<i>S2</i>	<i>S3</i>	<i>S4</i>	<i>S5</i>
<i>Age</i>	2.74	2.68	2.65	2.70	2.65
<i>College Degree</i>	0.94	0.95	0.93	0.93	0.95
<i>Gender</i>	0.47	0.47	0.51	0.48	0.49
<i>CCP Member</i>	0.23	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26
<i>International News</i>	0.83	0.85	0.81	0.83	0.82
<i>Coastal</i>	0.76	0.79	0.79	0.75	0.79
<i>West</i>	0.08	0.07	0.09	0.06	0.05
<i>Central</i>	0.17	0.14	0.13	0.19	0.16
<i>Income</i>	3.60	3.72	3.76	3.64	3.69
<i>Social Status</i>	4.91	5.11	5.10	5.10	5.06
<i>Regime type</i>	0.52	0.54	0.52	0.48	0.47
<i>Motive</i>	0.51	0.50	0.51	0.53	0.48
<i>Power</i>	0.54	0.48	0.44	0.47	0.53
<i>Stakes</i>	0.48	0.48	0.45	0.50	0.50

Notes: Age is measured in six age cohorts. Gender is an indicator variable with 1 indicating male. CCP member is an indicator variable with 1 indicating party member. Interest in international news is based on a question asking about how much the respondent cares about international news (1 = “care somewhat” and “care a lot”). Income is measured on a seven-point scale with 1 indicating less than 10,000 Yuan (approximately \$1,600) annual income. Social Status is respondent's self-perceived social group on a 10-point scale from poorest to richest. Regime type, motive, power, and stakes correspond to the four contextual variables embedded in the experiment. The bold numbers indicate that the variable is a statistically significant predictor ($p < 0.05$) of that scenario as opposed to the other scenarios in a logistic regression model.

Table B3: Covariates Balance across the Four Scenarios in Wave 3

<i>Scenarios</i>	<i>S1</i>	<i>S2</i>	<i>S3</i>	<i>S4</i>
<i>Age</i>	31.83	32.90	32.98	32.45
<i>Education</i>	6.73	6.72	6.76	6.77
<i>Gender</i>	0.48	0.48	0.52	0.52
<i>CCP Member</i>	0.26	0.28	0.29	0.27
<i>International News</i>	0.76	0.75	0.80	0.78
<i>Income</i>	3.70	3.52	3.61	3.65
<i>Social Status</i>	4.46	4.38	4.38	4.53
<i>Regime type</i>	0.51	0.50	0.51	0.49
<i>Motive</i>	0.52	0.48	0.49	0.51
<i>Cost</i>	0.53	0.57	0.42	0.48
<i>Stakes</i>	0.51	0.49	0.52	0.48

Notes: Age is measured in years. Education is a nine-point scale ranging from no formal education to doctorate. Gender is an indicator variable with 1 indicating male. CCP member is an indicator variable with 1 indicating party member. Interest in international news is based on a question asking about how much the respondent cares about international news (1 = “care somewhat” and “care a lot”). Income is measured on a seven-point scale with 1 indicating less than 10,000 Yuan (approximately \$1,600) annual income. Social Status is respondent's self-perceived social group on a 10-point scale from poorest to richest. Regime type, motive, cost, and stakes correspond to the four contextual variables embedded in the experiment. The bold numbers indicate that the variable is a statistically significant predictor ($p < 0.05$) of that scenario as opposed to the other scenarios in a logistic regression model.

Appendix C: Regression Analyses

Table C1: OLS Results of Respondent Evaluations in Wave 1

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Backing down from</i>			
Threat of Force	0.114 (0.226)	0.0827 (0.225)	0.0737 (0.225)
Display of Force	-0.0169 (0.215)	-0.0495 (0.215)	-0.0661 (0.216)
Use of Force with Casualty	-0.127 (0.220)	-0.209 (0.220)	-0.254 (0.220)
Use of Force without Casualty	0.544** (0.226)	0.522** (0.225)	0.525** (0.227)
Regime		0.101 (0.139)	0.151 (0.139)
Goal		-0.0944 (0.140)	-0.0937 (0.141)
Cost		-0.454*** (0.140)	-0.471*** (0.140)
Interest		0.316** (0.140)	0.311** (0.140)
Age			-0.00251 (0.0104)
Education			0.188* (0.103)
Male			0.209 (0.142)
CCP			-0.523*** (0.163)
International News			-0.420** (0.180)
Coastal			-0.0226 (0.152)
Western			-0.0786 (0.245)
Constant	3.446*** (0.157)	3.543*** (0.208)	3.092*** (0.668)
Observations	1,034	1,034	1,023
R-squared	0.010	0.026	0.044

Notes: Dependent variable is seven-point scale from “strongly approve” (1) to “strongly disapprove” (7). Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table C2: OLS Results of Respondent Evaluations in Wave 2

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Backing down from</i>			
Threat of Force	0.306*** (0.0873)	0.297*** (0.0872)	0.318*** (0.0888)
Display of Force	0.245*** (0.0868)	0.232*** (0.0868)	0.248*** (0.0892)
Use of Force with Casualty	0.0895 (0.0855)	0.0737 (0.0854)	0.0791 (0.0871)
Use of Force without Casualty	0.220** (0.0870)	0.213** (0.0869)	0.199** (0.0889)
Regime		-0.0301 (0.0545)	-0.0257 (0.0557)
Goal		0.0212 (0.0545)	0.0312 (0.0558)
Cost		-0.156*** (0.0546)	-0.140** (0.0559)
Interest		0.140** (0.0545)	0.142** (0.0557)
Age (Six Groups)			0.0282 (0.0349)
College Degree			0.0584 (0.123)
Male			0.0442 (0.0580)
CCP			-0.105 (0.0646)
International News			-0.120 (0.0793)
Coastal			-0.107 (0.0782)
Western			-0.326** (0.129)
Income			0.0339 (0.0207)
Social Status			-0.0652*** (0.0168)
Constant	3.192*** (0.0618)	3.214*** (0.0831)	3.480*** (0.189)
Observations	2,224	2,224	2,136
R-squared	0.007	0.014	0.028

Notes: Dependent variable is five-point scale from “strongly approve” (1) to “strongly disapprove” (5). Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table C3: OLS Results of Respondent Evaluations in Wave 3

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Empty Promise	0.367*** (0.122)	0.374*** (0.122)	0.390*** (0.123)
Deployed	0.0508 (0.122)	0.0383 (0.122)	0.0942 (0.123)
Withdrew	0.576*** (0.121)	0.575*** (0.121)	0.602*** (0.123)
Regime		-0.116 (0.0859)	-0.140 (0.0866)
Goal		0.00342 (0.0859)	-0.0234 (0.0867)
Cost		-0.0946 (0.0864)	-0.0709 (0.0871)
Interest		0.184** (0.0859)	0.184** (0.0867)
Age			-0.0100* (0.00512)
Education			0.134** (0.0534)
Male			0.0934 (0.0890)
CCP			-0.308*** (0.101)
International News			-0.481*** (0.110)
Income			0.0138 (0.0307)
Social Status			-0.0462 (0.0295)
Constant	3.019*** (0.0861)	3.033*** (0.124)	3.008*** (0.430)
Observations	2,114	2,114	2,061
R-squared	0.014	0.018	0.041


Notes: Dependent variable is seven-point scale from “strongly approve” (1) to “strongly disapprove” (7). Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Appendix D: Autocratic Audience Cost Using Ordinal Responses

In the main text, we used changes in the approval and disapproval responses to measure audience cost. This has the virtue of being intuitive and easily interpretable. Additionally, it also makes it possible to compare the results from Tomz (2007). That being said, this approach wastes information as the original responses were collapsed into the three categories of approval, neutral, and disapproval. Alternatively, we can use the original ordinal scale that combines both approval and disapproval information into a more precise measure, which makes it easier to detect significance if it exists.

Using a five-point scale from disapproval (1) to approval (5), we can calculate the mean differences between the control group and the verbal threat group. The results are plotted in Figure D1. Similar to Figure 1 in the main text, due to its small sample size and lack of power, the difference in wave 1 fails to achieve conventional statistical significance. But the differences in the wave 2 sample and the combined sample are both statistically significant. Once again, these results lend strong support to the hypothesis that empty threats could expose the Chinese government to disapproval from citizens.

Figure D1: Autocratic Audience Cost of Backing Down from Verbal Threat




Notes: This figure plots the rating differences between the two scenarios on the five-point scale with 95% confidence intervals. Sample sizes for “staying out” and “verbal threat” scenarios are 204 and 192 for wave 1, and 433 and 434 for wave 2.

Appendix E: Sub-group Analysis of Absolute Audience Cost

Figure E1 below reports heterogeneity of treatment effects in the combined sample across different sub-groups, also known as “local treatment effects” (Imai and Strauss, 2009). Here we focus on five socio-demographic variables: age, gender, education, CCP membership, and interest in international news. For age, we separate the respondents into two sub-groups: those younger than 30 and those aged 30 or above. For education, we look at people without college degrees and those with college degrees and higher. Interest in international news is based on a question asking how much the respondent cares about international news. We aggregate the original four-point scale into two sub-groups: those who “care little” or “do not care at all” and those who “somewhat care” or “care a lot.”

Figure E1: Sub-group Analysis of Absolute Audience Cost



Note: The absolute audience cost is calculated combining all four backing-down scenarios. Estimates are percentage points with 95% confidence intervals. Sample sizes for the stay-out and escalation scenarios, respectively, are 280 and 1,217 for “29 and younger”; 357 and 1,407 for “30 and older”; 314 and 1,286 for “male”; 323 and 1,338 for “female”; 57 and 257 for “no college”; 580 and 2,367 for “college and above”; 476 and 1,939 for “non-CCP”; 161 and 685 for “CCP”; 117 and 484 for “don’t really care”; and 520 and 2,140 for “care a lot.”

Appendix E: Survey Questionnaire

Introduction and Consent

We are conducting survey research on the opinions of Chinese citizens toward international political economic issues related to China. Your attitudes and opinions will be used for academic research only.

At the end of the survey, we will ask questions regarding your personal information, including age, gender, and education level. This survey is in strict accordance with relevant laws. We strictly adhere to the principle of confidentiality. We guarantee that we will keep your answers and your personal information confidential at all times and under all conditions. This questionnaire provides different types of options for different questions. Please select the option that best represents your choice. Thank you again for your participation and support.

If you agree to participate, please click Continue.

我们正在进行的这项问卷调查活动，是为了了解您本人对国际问题的观点、意见和看法，最后为学术研究打基础。完成这份问卷大约需要 10 分钟，问卷不记录您的单位和姓名，您给出的答案也无对错之分。

为分析需要，在问卷的最后，我们会询问一些您的个人信息（不包括姓名），包括年龄段、性别、学历、工作性质等。我们对问卷的处理将严格遵守国际标准的学术研究保密性原则。资料分析仅仅用于样本比较和描述总体情况，绝对不会将您的个人信息和意见透露给第三方。请根据您的实际情况填写。衷心感谢您的支持与合作。谢谢！

如果您同意参与，请点击继续。

Experiment used in Wave 1 and 2

The following question concerns China and its relation with other countries in the world. This is a hypothetical question China may encounter in the future.

Country A sent its military to take over a neighboring country B. The attacking country was led by a [dictator, who invaded/democratically elected government, which invaded] [to get more power and resources/because of a longstanding historical feud.] The attacking country had a [strong military, so it would/weak military, so it would not] have taken a major effort for the China to help push them out. A victory by the attacking country would [hurt/not affect] China's economic and security interests.

这个问题是关于中国与世界其他国家的关系。这是我们国家或许会面临的情况。我们将描述一个我国政府可能采取的对策，并询问您对这一对策的看法。

某国A派出军事力量攻击它的邻国B。发动攻击的国家A是[独裁政府 / 民主政府]，目的

是[追求更多的权力和资源 / 因为长期的历史宿怨]。中国政府面临一个重要选择：是否武力支援被攻击国B.攻击国A的 [军事力量强大，因此中国需要付出重大代价才能击退入侵国 / 军事力量一般，因此中国不需要付出重大代价就能击退入侵国]。此外，攻击国A的胜利[会伤害到 / 不会影响]中国的安全和经济利益。

[Each respondent is randomly chosen to view one of the five scenarios]

Scenario 1: The Chinese government said it will not intervene in the conflict. Country A continued to attack; in the end, the Chinese government did not send troops, and the invading country prevailed.

中国政府说不会理会这次冲突。入侵国继续攻击；中国政府没有派兵，入侵国最后胜利了。

Scenario 2: The Chinese government said if the invading country did not stop attacking, China would send troops to intervene. Country A continued to attack; in the end, the Chinese government did not send troops, and the invading country prevailed.

中国政府说如果入侵国不停止攻击，中国会派兵介入。入侵国继续攻击；中国政府没有派兵，入侵国最后胜利了。

Scenario 3: The Chinese government said if the invading country did not stop attacking, China would send troops to intervene. Country A continued to attack; The Chinese government sent troops to the border but did not intervene in the conflict. In the end, the invading country prevailed.

中国政府说如果入侵国不停止攻击，中国会派兵介入。入侵国继续攻击；中国政府派兵到边疆，但没有参战，入侵国最后胜利了。

Scenario 4: The Chinese government said if the invading country did not stop attacking, China would send troops to intervene. Country A continued to attack; The Chinese government sent in the troops, which destroyed a part of the military power of the invading countries and incurred no casualties; Country A continued its invasion, while Chinese troops pulled back. In the end, the invading country prevailed.

中国政府说如果入侵国不停止攻击，中国会派兵介入。入侵国继续攻击，中国政府派兵参战，并摧毁了入侵国一部分军事力量，中国军队没有伤亡；入侵国仍然继续攻击，中国政府没有继续参战，入侵国最后胜利了。

Scenario 5: The Chinese government said if the invading country did not stop attacking, China would send troops to intervene. Country A continued to attack; The Chinese government sent in the troops, which destroyed a part of the military power of the invading countries and incurred 200 casualties; Country A continued its invasion, while Chinese troops pulled back. In the end, the invading country prevailed.

中国政府说如果入侵国不停止攻击，中国会派兵介入。入侵国继续攻击，中国政府派兵参战，并摧毁了入侵国一部分军事力量，中国军队有200人伤亡；入侵国继续攻击，中国

政府没有继续参战，入侵国最后胜利了。

[Wave 1]

1. How would you evaluate the way the Chinese government handled the situation? 您如何评价中国政府的行动?

- Approve 赞成 [Go to Question 2]
- Disapprove 反对 [Go to Question 3]
- Neutral 中立 [Go to Question 4]

2. Do you approve strongly or somewhat strongly? 您赞成的程度的如何呢?

- Strongly 强烈赞成
- Somewhat strongly 一般赞成

3. Do you disapprove strongly or somewhat strongly? 您反对的程度的如何呢?

- Strongly 强烈反对
- Somewhat strongly 一般反对

4. Do you lean toward approving, disapproving, or don't lean either way? 如果您选择了中立, 你是

- Lean toward approving 倾向赞成
- Lean toward disapproving 倾向反对
- Don't lean either way 没有倾向

[Wave 2]

1. How would you evaluate the way the Chinese government handled the situation? 您如何评价中国政府的行动?

- Strongly approve 强烈赞成
- Approve 赞成
- Neutral 中立
- Disapprove 反对
- Strongly disapprove 强烈反对

Experiment used in Wave 3

The following question concerns China and its relation with other countries in the world. This is a hypothetical question China may encounter in the future.

A humanitarian crisis has occurred as a result of the military conflict between Country A and its neighboring country B. The country that initiated the conflict was led by a [dictator, who invaded/democratically elected government, which invaded] [to get more power and resources/because of a longstanding historical feud.] The United Nations passed a resolution to send peacekeeping troops to maintain order in the conflict zone. The Chinese government now faces an important decision on whether or not China should participate in the UN peacekeeping operation. The conflict zone is [large/small], and thus requires [significant/small] contributions

of material and human resources from China. In addition, failure of the peacekeeping operation would [hurt/not affect] China's economic and security interests.

这个问题是关于中国与世界其他国家的关系。这是我们国家或许会面临的情况。我们将描述一个我国政府可能采取的对策，并询问您对这一对策的看法。

某国 A 和它的邻国 B 爆发武装冲突，引发人道主义危机。发起冲突方是[独裁政府/民主政府]，发起原因是[追求更多的权力和资源/跟对方有长期的历史宿怨]。联合国通过决议准备派维和部队协助维持冲突地区秩序。中国政府面临一个重要选择：是否参与联合国的维和行动。[爆发冲突的地区规模很大，因此中国需要提供大量人员物资/爆发冲突的地区规模不大，因此中国只需要提供少量人员物资]。此外，维和行动失败导致的冲突激化[会/不会]伤害到中国的安全和经济利益。

[Each respondent is randomly chosen too view one of the four scenarios]

Scenario 1: The Chinese government said it would remain neutral about the conflict and did not participate in UN peacekeeping operations. The peacekeeping operations eventually failed, and the humanitarian crisis in the conflict zone continued to worsen.

中国政府称对此次冲突保持中立，没有参与联合国的维和行动。维和行动最终失败，冲突地区的人道主义危机持续恶化。

Scenario 2: The Chinese government committed to participating in United Nations peacekeeping operations, but did not actually sent peacekeepers. The peacekeeping operations eventually failed, and the humanitarian crisis in the conflict zone continued to worsen.

中国政府承诺参与联合国维和行动，然而实际并没有派维和人员。维和行动最终失败，冲突地区的人道主义危机持续恶化。

Scenario 3: The Chinese government committed to participating in United Nations peacekeeping operations, and sent peacekeepers to the conflict zone. The peacekeeping operations eventually failed, and the humanitarian crisis in the conflict zone continued to worsen.

中国政府承诺参与联合国维和行动，并派维和人员前往冲突地带，并加入联合国维和部队的具体行动。维和行动最终失败，冲突地区的人道主义危机持续恶化。

Scenario 4: The Chinese government committed to participating in United Nations peacekeeping operations. It initially sent peacekeepers to the conflict zone but withdrew during the middle of the operation. The peacekeeping operations eventually failed, and the humanitarian crisis in the conflict zone continued to worsen.

中国政府承诺参与联合国维和行动，并派维和人员前往冲突地带，加入联合国维和部队协助维持冲突地区秩序，并参与具体行动，但却在中途退出。维和行动最终失败，冲突地区的人道主义危机持续恶化。

1. How would you evaluate the way the Chinese government handled the situation? 您如何评价中国政府的行动？

- Approve 赞成 [Go to Question 2]
 - Disapprove 反对 [Go to Question 3]
 - Neutral 中立 [Go to Question 4]
2. Do you approve strongly or somewhat strongly? 您赞成的程度的如何呢?
- Strongly 强烈赞成
 - Somewhat strongly 一般赞成
3. Do you disapprove strongly or somewhat strongly? 您反对的程度的如何呢?
- Strongly 强烈反对
 - Somewhat strongly 一般反对
4. Do you lean toward approving, disapproving, or don't lean either way? 如果您选择了中立, 你是
- Lean toward approving 倾向赞成
 - Lean toward disapproving 倾向反对
 - Don't lean either way 没有倾向 [Go to Question 6]
5. Please elaborate on why you approved or disapproved the government's decision? 您支持 (反对) 中国政府的行动的主要原因是什么?
6. How do you view national reputation in international relations? Do you think that countries need to honor their commitments? 您怎么看待国际关系中的国家信誉问题? 国家需要遵守做出的诺言吗?
7. What would you do if they were dissatisfied with the government's foreign policies? 如果您对政府外交政策不满意, 一般您会怎么做?

Social Demographic Questions

- 1a: What year were you born? (Wave 1 and 3)
- 1b: How old are you? (Wave 2)
1. Less than 20
 2. 20-29
 3. 30-39
 4. 40-49
 5. 50-59
 6. 60 and above
- 2: What's your gender?
1. Male
 2. Female
- 3a: Which part of the country do you currently live in? ____ (Wave 1 and 2)

3b: Which part of the country do you currently live in? (Wave 3)

1. East (including Shandong, Jiangsu, Anhui, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shanghai)
2. South (including Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan)
3. Central (including Hubei, Hunan, Henan, Jiangxi)
4. North (including Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia)
5. Northwest (including Ningxia, Xinjiang, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Gansu)
6. Southwest Region (including Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, Tibet, Chongqing)
7. Northeast (including Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang)
8. Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan or overseas

4: What's your highest level of education? (First three categories collapsed to one in Wave 1)

1. No formal education
2. Primary school
3. Junior high school
4. Senior high school
5. Technical or Vocational school
6. Associate degree
7. Bachelor's degree
8. Master's degree
9. PhD

5: What is your political affiliation?

1. No affiliation
2. Chinese Communist Party member
3. Chinese Youth League member
4. Member of other democratic parties

6: What was your income last year? (Include crops, cotton, vegetables, and any other agricultural products you grow, secondary income from your labor, as well as salaries, bonuses, pensions, and all kinds of investment from your work outside the field.)

1. Less than 10,000 Yuan
2. 10,001-30,000 Yuan
3. 30,001-60,000 Yuan
4. 60,001-90,000 Yuan
5. 90,001-120,000 Yuan
6. 120,001-200,000 Yuan
7. More than 200,000 Yuan
8. Don't know
9. Refuse to answer

7: People can be divided into different social groups based on their economic conditions. In the scale below, 0 represents the poorest group and 10 represents the richest group. Which group do you consider yourself to be in? Please select a number from the scale that best corresponds to your group.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
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8. How much do you care about international news?

1. Care a lot
2. Care somewhat
3. So-so (only provided in Wave 1)
4. Care little
5. Do not care at all

1a: 请问您是哪一年出生的? (第一、第三轮)

1b: 请问您今年几岁? (第二轮)

1. 20 岁以下
2. 20-29 岁
3. 30-39 岁
4. 40-49 岁
5. 50-59 岁
6. 60 岁以上

2: 请问您的性别是?

1. 男性
2. 女性

3a: 请问您现在居住地是在哪? (填空题, 第一、第二轮)

3b: 请问您现在居住地是在哪? (第三轮)

1. 华东地区 (包括山东、江苏、安徽、浙江、福建、上海)
2. 华南地区 (包括广东、广西、海南)
3. 华中地区 (包括湖北、湖南、河南、江西)
4. 华北地区 (包括北京、天津、河北、山西、内蒙古)
5. 西北地区 (包括宁夏、新疆、青海、陕西、甘肃)
6. 西南地区 (包括四川、云南、贵州、西藏、重庆)
7. 东北地区 (包括辽宁、吉林、黑龙江)
8. 港澳台以及海外

4: 请问您已获得或在读的最高学历是? (第一轮中 1, 2, 3 合并为同一选项)

1. 没上过学
2. 小学
3. 初中
4. 高中
5. 职高/中专
6. 大专
7. 大学
8. 硕士研究生

9. 博士研究生

5: 请问您的政治面貌是?

1. 群众
2. 共产党员
3. 共青团员
4. 民主党派

6: 去年您本人的收入(包括所有的工资、奖金、第二职业收入、亲友馈赠、各种投资收益、其他所得、收获的粮、棉、蔬菜等实物折合的钱;工副业收入;出外做工挣的工资)大约为多少元(人民币)?

1. 10000 元及以下
2. 10001-30000 元
3. 30001-60000 元
4. 60001-90000 元
5. 90001-120000 元
6. 120001-200000 元
7. 200001 元及以上
8. 不知道
9. 拒绝回答

7: 按照经济条件,可以划分不同的社会群体。您会给自己定位在哪个群体? 这里有一个量表,用 0 分表示最贫困群体,10 分表示最富有群体。请从量表中选择一个数字表示您的定位。

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
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8. 您平时是否关心国际时事新闻?

- 非常关心
- 比较关心
- 一般 (第一轮没有这一选项)
- 不太关心
- 根本不关心